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Crises of the Republic: 
Transformations of State Sovereignty and the 
Prospects of Democratic Citizenship1
The title of this essay, “Crises of the Republic,” refers to a collec-
tion of Hannah Arendt’s essays composed during the late 1960s 
and early 70s in the USA, which saw the shootings of John F. 
Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King; the escala-
tion of the Vietnam War, the publication of the Pentagon papers, 
the Watergate break-in, increasing violent confrontations in inner 
city neighborhoods, the infiltration of the Black Panther Move-
ment by the CIA, and clashes among various wings of the Black 
Liberation Movement. It seemed as if there were invisible forces 
pulling the social fabric of American society apart.2 Lying in poli-
tics became the norm and political rivalry descended to the level 
of criminality. It was this anguish which led Hannah Arendt to 
speak of “the crises of the republic” and to ask whether demo-
cratic citizenship was still possible.
W.E.B. Du Bois (1868–1963) was responding to a related set of 
conflicts which were tearing American society apart when he 
asked: “Can I be both [an American and a Negro]? […] Or is it 
my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and to become 
an American?”3 Finding no way to reconcile this contradiction 
within the context of the institutions of his time, Du Bois became 
a Pan-Africanist and chose to leave the USA for Ghana, never to 
return. Both he and Arendt were profoundly cognizant of the con-
dition of the “self-conscious pariah,” of the outsider, who chose 
to remain an outsider, instead of becoming a parvenu and accept-
ing social conformism.
Whereas the social and political thought of mid-twentieth century 
was preoccupied with the capacity of society to accommodate 
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equality for all while recognizing racial difference, understood 
prominently in terms of the “Black-White” divide, today we face 
another set of crises, no less challenging than days past but more 
global in character. If I may phrase this somewhat pointedly, I 
would say that whereas formerly it was society that was torn 
apart – and not only in the USA – through class conflict, war, 
race riots, ethnic tensions and gender struggles, today’s crises 
are generated by the diminishing capacity of nation-states to 
navigate an increasingly complex, fluid, and obscure security as 
well as economic environment. Since the end of the Cold War 
it is the world state-system and the Westphalian model of sov-
ereignty that are in crises. Today the global poor and the global 
rich face off in an environment where the state, which was once 
viewed as an instrument of oppression of the poor and racial mi-
norities, is disappearing, leaving in its wake (as after Hurricane 
Katrina) collapsing public institutions and frayed solidarity. The 
poor, the colored, the ex-, post- and neo-colonials are the victims 
of the receding power of the state.
We are in the midst of a transfiguration of citizenship and sov-
ereignty: whether these forces add up to a refiguration of these 
institutions or to their demise beyond recognition, at which point 
the project of democracy itself becomes meaningless, is hard to 
tell.
—————
It is appropriate to begin my considerations on transfigurations 
of citizenship and sovereignty, with some reflections on the most 
significant political event of this brief twenty-first century. The 
events of September 11, 2001, in retrospect, reveal themselves 
as one of those marking moments when we become aware of the 
sway of Kairos (fate, destiny) over our lives. This is painfully 
true for those individuals who were caught that day in the may-
hem of fire, steel, synthetic material, cement and debris, some of 
whom sought to escape this techno-industrial inferno by jump-
ing to their death. For days afterward, downtown Manhattan 
emitted a putric smell of organic and inorganic material, which 
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conveyed, even to those of us who had been far away from the 
site, a sense of the frightening powers of a material civilization 
whose instruments of civil aviation could be turned into weap-
ons of destruction.
September 11, 2001 in New York has been followed by the 
Madrid bombings in March 2004, and by the London subway 
bombings in July 2005. These events and the wars upon Afghani-
stan and Iraq have rattled the world society of states to its core: 
contradictions, fissures and crises in what is commonly referred 
to as the “Westphalian” model of state sovereignty have erupted 
unto world stage. What is novel about our political situation?
First, non-state agents who are capable of inflicting large scale 
violence on states with ever new means of mass destruction have 
emerged unto the world stage. The use of civilian airplanes as 
weapons or suicide bombings in crowded trains and subways 
inflict shock upon the population, but they pale in comparison 
with the potential deployment of biological, chemical and nu-
clear agents by similar groups. 
Second, the new means of electronic communication, the ease 
of global air travel, the emergence of transnational networks of 
finance and weapons procurement, along with the unprotected 
borders of weak states, are producing transnational modalities of 
violence. Potentially the whole globe has become the site of the 
new conflict between Islamic jihadist groups and their enemies. 
There is a globalization of the sites of confrontation which car-
ries little connection to the logic of interstate political conflict. 
Third, compared to terrorist movements of the late 1960s and 
70s the global jihadist groups are short in words and ideology 
and quick to act; there is frequently only a slim connection be-
tween the acts which they undertake and self-interested political 
results they may wish to produce. More often than not, they aim 
to remind the world of their continuing presence. They perpe-
trate a symbolic politics of fear in the enemy and martyrdom for 
the fighters themselves.
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Fourth, the presence of this diffuse global enemy, whose net-
works range from “sleeper” cells in Hamburg to Lakawhana, NY, 
from Islamabad to Madrid and to Bali, erases the lines between 
the enemy within and without, the foreigner at home and the alien 
other. Police action, security operations, and military planning 
flow into each other. The creation of Homeland Security Admi-
nistration in the USA, which has now absorbed the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, is one of the clearest signals of the 
criminalization of immigration; the foreigner, in virtue of being 
the outsider, is potentially viewed as an enemy alien. This as-
sumption not only contradicts the principles of an open society 
based on immigration, it also gives those within the borders a 
false sense of security by pretending that there can be no political 
enemies at home who side with the goals of extremist Islamist 
movements.
These four features of the post–9/11 world – the emergence of 
non-state actors as agents of mass violence; the deterritorializa-
tion of violence; the symbolic politics of fear and martyrdom, and 
the vanishing lines between military, police and security func-
tions – are among the political and security challenges which in-
creasing numbers of states will face in the new century.
While few would deny the novelty of these challenges, there is 
justifiable skepticism that US foreign policy since September 
11, 2001 was undertaken solely as a response to those events. 
The United Nations is under siege, and there is a departure from 
the principle of the formal equality of sovereign states toward 
a remoralization of international relations through demands that 
formal recognition be made dependent upon substantive regime 
characteristics and not only upon state behavior in compliance 
with international law. We are in an extremely multivalent as well 
as slippery moment in world-politics when the changing security 
situation after September 11, together with growing trends to-
ward the disaggregation of sovereignty in the international realm, 
come together to destabilize the principle of the formal equality 
of states on which the United Nations rests. On the one hand, the 
shield of state sovereignty has been pierced by the development 
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of an international regime of human rights; on the other hand, 
while formal state sovereignty is everywhere challenged and even 
threatened by the use of categories such as “rogue state” and “ter-
rorist harboring regime,” it is being aggressively asserted by the 
world’s sole super-power as its prerogative. The reassertion of 
sovereignty through the Bush Administration is not an honest ef-
fort to reinstate this as a general norm; rather, it is an insistence 
upon American exceptionalism in the face of international law 
to determine and interpret unilaterally the nature of international 
obligations. It is this post-Westphalian juncture that we must seek 
to understand.
There is general and contentious disagreement among contempo-
rary theorists as to how to assess this new constellation of events 
and forces. While some write of global civil war and the generali-
zation of the state of exception (Giorgio Agamben), others depict 
the emergence of transnational norms (Anne-Marie Slaughter), or 
of global law without the state (Guenter Teubner), or of cosmo-
politan governance (David Held). Implicit in all these diagnoses 
is a view of the limits and weaknesses of the current state-system 
and of the nation-state itself. As Jean L. Cohen rightly observes: 
“The general claim is that the world is witnessing a move to cos-
mopolitan law. […] But […] if one shifts the political perspec-
tive, the sovereignty-based model of international law appears to 
be ceding not to cosmopolitan justice but to a different bid to 
restructure the world order: the project of empire.”4
Cosmopolitan norms or empire? Are they the only alternatives? It 
is crucial to unravel this ambivalent potential between the alterna-
tives of the emergence of cosmopolitan norms intended to protect 
the individual in a world society on the one hand and the dangers 
as well as benefits of the transfiguration of state sovereignty on 
the other. The fact that the internationalization of human rights 
norms and the weakening of state sovereignty are developing in 
tandem with each other does not mean that the one can be redu-
ced to the other; nor should objections to the weakening of state 
sovereignty lead one to reject the spread of human rights norms 
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for fear that they can be used to justify humanitarian interven-
tions. 
In the following, I distinguish the vertical disaggregation of so-
vereignty from its horizontal disaggregation and both from de-
territorialization of law and show how the cosmopolitan project 
is interwoven with some of these trends. Since these transforma-
tions are altering norms of state sovereignty as well as impacting 
the actual capacity of states to exercise sovereignty, I focus on 
the interrelationship between state sovereignty and popular sove-
reignty. The concept of “sovereignty” ambiguously refers to two 
moments in the foundation of the modern state, and the history of 
modern political thought in the West since Thomas Hobbes can 
plausibly be told as a negotiation of these poles: first, sovereign-
ty means the capacity of a public body, in this case the modern 
nation-state, to act as the final and indivisible seat of authority 
with the jurisdiction to wield not only “monopoly over the means 
of violence,” to recall Max Weber’s famous phrase, but also to 
distribute justice and manage the economy. In the course of the 
last three centuries the sovereign Rechtsstaat has become the So-
zialstaat.
Sovereignty also means, particularly since the French Revoluti-
on, popular sovereignty, that is, the idea of the people as subjects 
and objects of the law, or as makers as well as obeyers of the law. 
Popular sovereignty involves representative institutions, the sepa-
ration of powers, and the guarantee not only of liberty and equali-
ty, but of the “equal value of the liberty of each.” Etienne Balibar 
has expressed the interdependence between state sovereignty and 
popular sovereignty thus: “state sovereignty has simultaneously 
‘protected’ itself from and ‘founded’ itself upon popular sove-
reignty to the extent that the political state has been transformed 
into a ‘social-state’ […] passing through the progressive instituti-
on of a ‘representation of social forces’ by the mechanism of uni-
versal suffrage and the institutions of social citizenship […].”5
The question is: how does the new configuration of state sove-
reignty influence popular sovereignty? Which political options 
51
are becoming possible? Which are blocked? I want to say right 
at the outset, again with Balibar, that “today’s crises affect both 
states that have never been able to constitute themselves as nation-
states in the strong sense, others that cannot remain nation-states 
by themselves, and finally others still who think they may have 
found a way of overturning, to their advantage, the old nomos of 
the earth.”6 Cosmopolitan norms enhance the project of popular 
sovereignty while prying open the black box of state sovereignty. 
What is undermining state sovereignty is not the abuse of cosmo-
politan and humanitarian norms of justice, though they certainly 
have served as ideological shields to justify interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; rather, it is first and foremost the demands of 
global capitalism that have led to transformations in state sove-
reignty and to the deterioration of the capacity of states to protect 
and provide for their citizens. 
Disaggregating Sovereignty: Vertical Uncoupling
The modern state formation in the West begins with the “terri-
torialization” of space. The enclosure of a particular portion of 
the earth and its demarcation from others through the creation 
of protected boundaries, and the presumption that all that lies 
within these boundaries, whether animate or inanimate, belongs 
under the dominion of the sovereign is central to the territorially-
bounded system of states in western modernity. The territorial 
state guards its borders against intruders abroad and toward sub-
versives at home through the maintaining of an army and po-
lice force; taxes are levied and fees collected to sustain the state 
and its coercive apparatus; the modern state also creates citizens 
through disciplining the population via education, military ser-
vice, administration, and economic productivity. 
Above all, the new territorial state must consolidate its authority 
against competing feudal, local, tribal and religious forms of law 
and jurisdiction. Territorial integrity and a unified jurisdictional 
authority are two sides of the same coin; the proof of the capacity 
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to protect territorial integrity is the obverse side of the power of 
the state to assert its jurisdictional authority (dominium).
The modern absolutist states of western Europe, governed, in Carl 
Schmitt’s terms, by the “jus publicum Europaeum” as their inter-
national law, are the paradigm cases to which the term “Westpha-
lian sovereignty” applies. I will define Westphalian sovereign-
ty as the view that the sovereign has absolute authority over all 
animate and inanimate objects within the territorially recognized 
and circumscribed boundaries. However, this model was unstable 
from its inception or in Stephen Krasner’s famous phrase “sove-
reignty is hypocrisy.”7 Already the discovery of the Americas, the 
imperialist ventures into India and China, the struggle for domi-
nation over the Indian Ocean and the 19th century colonization 
of Africa destroyed this form of state sovereignty and interna-
tional law by chipping at the peripheries.8 Not only the West’s 
confrontation with other continents, but already the question as 
to whether the non-Christian Ottoman Empire belonged to the 
“jus publicum Europaeum” showed the limitations of this order. 
Though Schmitt himself is not far from idealizing this historical 
moment between the 16th and 19th centuries in the evolution of 
“the law of the earth,” his own account documents its inherent 
limits and eventual dissolution.9 The “deterritorialization” of the 
modern state goes hand in hand with its transformation from ear-
ly bourgeois republics into European empires, whether they be 
those of England, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Nether-
lands or Italy.
This transformation of bourgeois republics into empires destroys 
the overlap of territorial control with jurisdictional authority, 
which governs, at least in principle, the motherland. Europe’s 
colonies become the sites of usurpation and conquest in which 
extra-juridical spaces, removed from the purview of liberal prin-
ciples, are created. As Edmund Burke was to express it pithily 
with respect to “administrative massacres” in India, and the im-
peachment of Warren Hastings who was responsible for them by 
the British House, this needed to be done so that “breakers of 
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the law in India might [not] become ‘the makers of law for Eng-
land.’”10
The rise of bourgeois and democratic republics from within the 
boundaries of the early absolutist states transforms the “subject” 
of the state into a “citizen.” As the Westphalian paradigm of so-
vereignty meets its limits outside Europe, it is also constitutio-
nalized at home, by social struggles for increased accountability, 
universal suffrage, expanded representation, democratic free-
doms and social rights. These struggles are the sites of popular 
sovereignty, of demands to make the state apparatus responsive to 
and transparent to its citizens. Struggles for citizenship and popu-
lar sovereignty at home, and imperialist ventures abroad go hand 
in hand.11 Who was/is the citizen of this new territorially bound 
state?12 How was s/he demarcated from the colonial subject?
The challenges we face today arise through yet another uncou-
pling between territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship, this time 
through the intensification of world-wide migrations in the era 
of globalization. Whereas in the 19th and 20th centuries, European 
imperialism heralded the uncoupling of jurisdiction from territo-
rial control under popular sovereignty, in that in the colonies the 
principle of consent was undermined, contemporary migratory 
movements give rise to overlapping jurisdictions.
While in 1910 roughly 33 million migrants lived in countries oth-
er than their own, by the year 2000 their number had reached 175 
million.13 During this same period (1910–2000), the population of 
the world grew from 1.6 to 5.3 billion, roughly threefold. Migra-
tions, by contrast, increased almost sixfold over the course of the 
same ninety years. Strikingly, more than half of this occurred in 
the last three decades of the 20th century, between 1965 and 2000. 
In this period 75 million people undertook cross-border move-
ments to settle in countries other than those of their origin.14
Transformations in patterns of migration are leading more and 
more individuals to retain continuing ties with their home coun-
tries and not to become fully integrated in their countries of im-
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migration. The ease provided by globalized networks of trans-
portation, communication, electronic media, banking and finan-
cial services is producing guest workers, seasonal workers, dual 
nationals, and diasporic commuters. Migrations no longer bring 
with them total immersion and socialization in the culture of the 
host country – a process poignantly symbolized by the assign-
ment to new immigrants to the USA of new family names in Ellis 
Island for example. Increasingly, migrations are a resource that 
states are jealously competing with one another to manipulate. 
These efforts are yielding the increasing uncoupling of territori-
ality and jurisdiction, hence contributing to the disaggregation of 
sovereignty.
Nation-states are encouraging diasporic politics among their mi-
grants and ex-citizens, seeing in the diaspora not only a source 
of political support for projects at home, but also a resource of 
networks, skills and competencies that can be used to enhance a 
state’s own standing in an increasingly global world. Nationals 
outside one’s boundaries become politico-economic and cultural 
emissaries of the sender country, frequently exercising pressure 
on behalf of their countries of origin to affect policies in host 
countries, not to mention serving as a considerable source of re-
venue and foreign reserves. Notable examples of such diasporas 
are the large Indian, Chinese and Jewish communities across the 
globe. Their continuing allegiance to the so-called “home coun-
try” is carefully cultivated.15
Migrations thus lead to a pluralization of allegiances and com-
mitments and to the growing complexity of nationals who, more 
often than not, in today’s world, are also ex-, post- and neo-colo-
nials. We are witnessing the increasing migration from periphery 
to center, encouraged by wide differentials in standards of living 
between regions of the world, and facilitated by the large pre-
sence of family and kin already at the center of what was once 
the Empire. Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris and Sri Lankans in the 
UK; Algerians and Moroccans in France; Surinamese and Moluc-
cans in The Netherlands; Latin Americans in Spain; Libyans in 
Italy are all populations groups whose history is deeply bound up 
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with European Empires. Migrations reveal the “permeability” of 
the state’s borders: the Westphalian state which extended towards 
the rest of the world now finds that its borders are porous in both 
directions and that it is not only the center which flows to the pe-
riphery but the periphery which flows towards the center.
This condition demystifies sovereignty to be an absolute instance. 
Sovereignty always signified a systemic relation among sove-
reigns, considered formally free and equal. State sovereignty, 
which is imminently bound up with the ability to protect borders, 
depends upon skillful negotiations, transactions, agreements and 
flows with other states. Of course, states differ in their ability to 
assert their sovereignty and to throw their weight around. The 
poorer economies of Central America, South Asia and Africa are 
more dependent upon the remittances and continuing allegiance 
of their diasporic populations than are the resource-rich econo-
mies of North America and Europe. At the eye of the storm, one’s 
vision is calm and distorted. But the storm raging around the eye 
can eventually disturb the calm at the center as well.
Migrations are the site of intense conflicts over resources as well 
as identities. In the contemporary world, strong states militari-
ze and increasingly criminalize migratory movements. The poor 
migrant becomes the symbol of the continuing assertion of sove-
reignty. Migrants’ bodies, both dead and alive, strew the path of 
states’ power.
Militarization and criminalization are defensive responses to the 
inevitable disaggregation of sovereignty through migrations. This 
process, which I name “vertical disaggregation” of sovereignty, 
suggests another model for thinking about sovereignty besides 
the autochtonous impermeability of states still praised by Carl 
Schmitt. Can we still maintain the ideal of popular sovereignty 
and democratic rule if the state-centered model of sovereignty is 
itself becoming dysfunctional?
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Disaggregating Sovereignty: Horizontal Uncoupling
Transnational migrations reveal the interdependence of states 
upon the world-wide movement of peoples as well as each other’s 
policies. Since every inch of the face of the world, with the ex-
ception of North and South Poles, are now etatized, and governed 
by a state which has territorial jurisdiction, cross-border move-
ments initiated by migrants as well as refuge and asylum seekers 
bring to light the fragility as well as the frequent irrationality of 
the state-system. Vis-à-vis people’s cross-border movements, the 
state remains sovereign, albeit in much reduced fashion. Vis-à-
vis the movement of capital and commodities, information and 
technology across borders, the state today is more hostage than 
sovereign.16
A great deal has been written in recent years about globalization 
as a world-wide phenomenon and the subsequently diminished 
capacity of states. I am persuaded by the argument that to under-
stand this phenomenon it is analytically more useful to use the 
term “stateness,” that is the dynamic capacity of states to react to 
and control their environments in multiple ways.17 There is tre-
mendous variation across the globe in the capacity of “stateness.” 
The affluent democracies of North America, Europe, Australia, 
and New Zealand can manipulate, tame and channel the forces 
of global capitalism to a certain degree, as well as attempting 
to influence the world-wide flow of information, communication 
and transportation technologies. This is obviously much less true 
for many states in North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, 
and Asia. The rise to global prominence of China, India and Bra-
zil, as well as the Asian “tiger” economies, is in large measure a 
consequence of the capacity of these states to channel economic 
globalization to their own advantage.
In her analysis of these processes with respect to Southeast Asi-
an economies, Aihwa Ong gives a compelling example, namely 
the creation of “multinational zones of sovereignty” in the form 
growth triangles (GTs). These “straddle borders between neigh-
boring states such as to maximize the locational advantage and 
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attract global capital.”18 The three GT’s formed by linking neigh-
boring countries are Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore (Sijori), In-
donesia–Malaysia–Thailand, and Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–
Philippines. Transnational corporations such as Nike, Reebok, 
and the Gap now employ millions of women who work twelve 
hours a day and make less than $2.00 a day. Ong observes that 
these “growth triangles are zones of special sovereignty that are 
arranged through a multinational network of smart partnerships 
and that exploit the cheap labor that exists within the orbit of a 
global hub such as Singapore. It appears that GT workers are less 
subject to the rules of their home country and more to the rules of 
companies and to the competitive conditions set by other growth 
triangles in the region.”19
A parallel account is provided by Carolin Emcke of the workings 
of the maquilladoras in Central America. These are established 
by foreign capital in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica 
under the protection of respective governments often as tax-free 
zones to attract foreign investment. They protect the zones they 
occupy through the use of private security guards and forces, 
crush any attempt to organize the labor force, and fiercely defend 
themselves against international and even national control and 
supervision. They resemble the castles of medieval warlords who 
have taken the native populations hostage.20
Whether it is the Growth Triangles of Southeast Asia or the ma-
quilladoras of Central America, this form of economic globaliza-
tion results in the disaggregation of states’ sovereignty with their 
own complicity. There is an uncoupling once more of jurisdiction 
and territory in that the state transfers its own powers of jurisdic-
tion, whether in full knowledge or by unintended consequence, 
to non-statal private and corporate bodies. The losers in this pro-
cess are the citizens from whom state protection is withdrawn, 
or more likely, who never had strong state protection in the first 
place, and who become dependent upon the power and mercy of 
transnational corporations and other forms of venture capitalists.
58
Despite the great variation across countries with respect to the 
interactions of the global economy and states, one generalization 
can be safely made: economic globalization is leading to a funda-
mental transformation of legal institutions and of the paradigm of 
the rule of law. Increasingly globalization is engendering a body 
of law which is self-generating and self-regulating and which 
does not originate through the legislative or deliberative activity 
of national legislators.
In his influential article, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in 
the World Society,” Gunther Teubner makes this case: “Today’s 
globalization is not a gradual emergence of a world society under 
the leadership of interstate politics, but is a highly contradictory 
and highly fragmented process in which politics has lost its lea-
ding role.”21 As examples of global law without a state Teubner 
cites “Lex mercatoria,” the transnational law of economic trans-
actions; labor law, where enterprises and labor unions, acting as 
private actors become law-makers; the technical standardization 
and professional self-regulation engaged worldwide by the rele-
vant parties without the intervention of official politics. Teubner 
adds human rights, ecology, and sports as other domains in which 
law and law-like norms emerge without the direct regulatory in-
tervention of states.
This emergent body of law is “a legal order,” even if it has no spe-
cific point of origination in the form of a law-producing institu-
tion and even less a single and visible law-enforcing agency. The 
boundaries of global law are not set by national borders; once 
more territorial boundaries and jurisdictional powers are uncou-
pled. Global law is transterritorial law, whose limits are set by 
“‘invisible colleges,’ ‘invisible markets and branches,’ ‘invisible 
professional communities,’ ‘invisible social networks’ […].”22
Global law is celebrated by Teubner as initiating a new form of 
legal pluralism and may be even a new form of politics which is 
to be distinguished from empire, or from the Pax Americana. But 
as Teubner acknowledges this form of law has serious democratic 
deficits. “It is a law that grows and changes according to the exi-
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gencies of global economic transactions and organizations. This 
makes its extremely vulnerable to interest and power pressures 
from economic processes.”23 It is indeterminate and can change 
in its application from case to case.24 While this makes it flexible 
and adaptable, it also makes it subject to outside influences. Soft 
law is law without the characteristics traditionally associated with 
the rule of law: transparency, predictability, uniformity of appli-
cation as well as accountability to a demos. These features of the 
rule of law are not mere procedural characteristics, since they act 
as guarantees of the equality of citizens before the law. Global 
law which lacks these characteristics, therefore, is not equality-
guaranteeing and equality-protecting for citizens, rather it is law 
which enables global corporations and other bodies to carry out 
their transactions in an increasingly complex environment by ge-
nerating self-binding and self-regulating norms.
That economic globalization threatens core features of the rule of 
law and thereby challenges the prospects for liberal democracy as 
well is emphatically argued by William E. Scheuerman in Liberal 
Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time:
Contemporary capitalism is different in many ways from its 
historical predecessors: economies driven by huge transna-
tional corporations that make effective use of high-speed 
communication, information, and transportation technolo-
gies represent a relatively novel development. The relation-
ship of capitalism to the rule of law is thereby transformed as 
well… As high-speed social action “compresses” distance, 
the separation between domestic and foreign affairs erodes, 
and the traditional vision of the executive as best suited to 
the dictates of rapid-fire foreign policy making undermines 
basic standards of legality in the domestic sphere as well.25
The transformation of the rule of law gives rise to “fast-track le-
gislation,” pushed by national legislators without adequate debate 
and deliberation; the power of deliberative bodies is eclipsed and 
that of the executive increases. “The main problem posed by glo-
balization is less that transnational business can only preserve its 
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autonomy by limiting state power by means of the rule of law 
than that the democratic nation-state can only hope to maintain 
its independence in relation to global business by counteracting 
the virtually universal competitive rush to provide transnational 
firms with special rights and privileges.”26 States have to avoid 
the “race to the bottom,” that is to embrace neo-liberal reforms, 
cutting back on the welfare-state and relaxing labor and environ-
mental legislations.
Law without a State? Or race to the bottom? I had previously 
asked: the spread of cosmopolitan norms or imperialism? Again 
we seem confronted by unpalatable alternatives and disjunctions. 
Surely, these are not the only options which globalization pro-
cesses confront us with, but in either case, the model of liberal 
sovereignty, based upon the unity of jurisdiction administered 
over a defined territory and assuring citizens’ equality through 
the administration of the rule of law, more and more appears as if 
it were the memory of a quaint past. It is important to emphasize 
though that sovereign states are players with considerable power 
in this process: they themselves often nurture and guide the very 
transformations which appear to curtail or limit their own po-
wers.
Whether it be through the changing patterns of transnational mi-
grations, through the emergence of Growth Triangles and new 
global forms of law without a state in the accelerated and fluid 
global market place, or through the pressure to adapt state burea-
ucracies to the new capitalism, an epochal change is under way 
in which aspects of state sovereignty are being dismantled chip 
by chip. As new agents of jurisdiction in the form of multinati-
onal corporations emerge, state jurisdiction and territoriality are 
uncoupled. Frequently, the state disburses its own jurisdiction to 
private agencies in order to escape the territorial control of popu-
lar legislators. The social contract is increasingly frayed.
If the analysis presented above is partially accurate, does the 
“twilight of state sovereignty” mean the end of democratic poli-
tics, the displacement of the political or maybe even its eventual 
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disappearance in the evolution of world societies? What are the 
normative consequences of these transformations? What light 
does this social-theoretic analysis shed on the political philoso-
phies of the present period?
Twilight of Sovereignty and Democratic Reiterations
Further differentiations are needed to round off this broad picture. 
Just as the capacity of nation-states to exercise their stateness va-
ries considerably, so do their reactions to the shrinking sphere 
of state autonomy and activity. Vis-à-vis the economic, ecolo-
gical, legal challenges and the growing fluidity of world wide 
migrations, the states of Europe have chosen the cooperative re-
structuring of sovereignty; the European Union, despite all its 
problems at the present, is one of the most impressive attempts to 
deal with the current crisis by reconfiguring sovereignty and by 
disaggregating it, that is by distributing the marks of sovereignty 
among various instances – sometimes referred to as First, Second 
and Third Pillar of EU law. The skeptics ask whether this coope-
rative restructuring of sovereignty has not lost sight of popular 
sovereignty. The vast literature on the presence or absence of a 
European demos reflects this anxiety.
To be juxtaposed to this cooperative restructuring of sovereignty 
is the unilateral reassertion of sovereignty. At the present time 
not only the United States, but China, Iran and India as well have 
chosen this route – not to mention Russia, North Korea and Israel. 
The strategy here is to strengthen the state via attempts to gather 
all the markers of sovereignty in the body of one public autho-
rity, with the consequence of increased militarization, disregard 
for international law and human rights, regressive and hostile re-
lations with neighbors, criminalization of migration and cross-
border movements. Particularly since these unilateral actions of 
the state are still incapable of influencing the global economic 
context, in such instances strengthening the state comes at the 
cost of popular sovereignty, by restricting liberties at home and 
leading toward the ill-treatment of nationals abroad. Global neo-
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liberalism and the unleashing of market forces seem to go hand in 
hand with the authoritarian reassertions of sovereignty.
The third alternative is the weakening of the already fragile insti-
tutions of state sovereignty, as we see in vast regions of Africa, 
Central and Latin America, and South Asia. In these cases global 
market forces further destabilize fragile economies: they break 
up the bond between local elites and the vast army of the poor 
and the downtrodden and leave them to the mercy of maquilla-
doras, paramilitaries, drug lords, and criminal gangs. The state 
withdraws into a shell, as has happened in the Ivory Coast, the 
Congo, the Sudan, El Salvador, some parts of Brazil, and Burma 
etc. Under such conditions popular sovereignty takes the form, at 
best, of guerilla warfare and at worst, of equally criminal groups 
fighting to gain a piece of the pie. Neither the contraction of state-
ness nor its militarized reassertion are compatible with popular 
sovereignty.
This sociologically differentiated picture needs to be juxtaposed 
to the currently very popular language of “empire” and “the mul-
titude.” Empire, according to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
is the ever-expanding power of global capital to bring farther 
and farther reaches of the world into its grip.27 Unlike the ex-
tractive and exploitative empires of the past however, the new 
empire encourages the spread of human rights norms; it pushes 
the new technologies of networking thus destroying the walls of 
separation and generating a new global connectivity consonant 
with this new age. Critics who see this as part of a global civil 
war perpetrated against the poor of the earth are fixated on old 
paradigms which have an exploitative hegemon at their center. 
Even the USA cannot be this new hegemon: its military power is 
supreme but its political power is circumscribed by international 
institutions.28
Since the webs of empire are so ubiquitous, sites of resistance to 
it are diffuse, decentered and multiple. The “multitude” resists 
the total penetration of life structures by the empire by organizing 
demonstrations against the G-7, the World Bank, the Gulf War, 
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the Iraq War and the violation of international law. The multitude 
goes out into the streets and connects with resisters all over the 
globe. In fact, local activism and global activism merge with one 
another since many local groups also participate in these world-
wide demonstrations from Seattle to Genoa. The multitude fo-
cuses on power as a global phenomenon and attempts to generate 
a counter-force to empire.29 Their actions exemplify a form of 
agency beyond the binarism of member/non-member. Not only 
migrants but also refugees who have been admitted into a coun-
try either legally or illegally, undocumented migrants – les sans 
papiers – are agents of this new activism.
The metaphors of networking, entanglement, binding, the spread 
of communicative forms etc. which underlie this social-theoreti-
cal analysis are lopsided precisely because they present a world 
without institutional actors and without structured centers of resi-
stance. Just as in Michel Foucault’s theory of power, the subjects 
of power are interpellated by it, i.e constituted in part through the 
network of power rather than preceding it, in Hardt and Negri’s 
analysis as well, states and other world institutions disappear as 
agents and sites of resistance that have prior constitution. But one 
can stipulate the existence of very distinct and structured institu-
tions and patterns of resistance to power without presupposing a 
metaphysical primordiality of either the state or of the subject. 
The reach of empire is neither as ubiquitous nor as omniscient 
as Hardt and Negri would like us to think. That is why, as was 
argued at the beginning, September 11 constituted such a shock 
to the body politic of the USA and revealed the vulnerability of 
empire’s population.
Relatedly, the multitude, Hardt’s and Negri’s revolutionary sub-
ject, is not the citizen. The multitude is not even the carrier of 
popular sovereignty since it lacks the drive toward the constitu-
tionalization of power, which has been the desiderata of all po-
pular movements since the American and French revolutions. 
The multitude gives expression to the rage of those who have 
lost their republics: the multitude smashes institutions and resists 
power. It does not engage in what Hannah Arendt has called the 
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“constitutio libertatis.”30 By contrast, popular sovereignty aims 
at widening the circle of representation among all members of 
the demos in an enduring form; popular sovereignty aims at the 
control of state power via the separation of powers between the 
judiciary, the legislative and the executive; popular sovereignty 
means creating structures of accountability and transparency in 
the public exercise of power. This is a far cry from the politics of 
the multitude.
This aspect of the legitimate exercise of power is well noted in 
contemporary debates by theorists of transnational governance 
such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Held. At the roots of 
empire’s extension, argue advocates of transnational democra-
cy, lies a problem of legitimation. We are in the grips of forces 
and processes which resemble the galloping horseman without a 
head. Decisions are made in exclusive board meetings of the IMF, 
WTO and the World Bank affecting the lives of millions, while 
nation-states refuse to sign multilateral treaties such as the Kyoto 
Convention or the Rome Treaty leading to the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court. Progress on treaties for the re-
duction of weapons of mass destruction – including biological, 
chemical, and radiological agents are bogged down in self-in-
terested myopia; when genocide occurs the UN hides behind lin-
guistic niceties in order not to have to commit troops. It is foolish 
to believe that focusing on the local will help solve any of these 
problems; the local is not beyond the global but constituted and 
permeated by it through and through. Theorists of the multitude 
seem to confuse politics with carnival. What matters is not the 
numbers that gather in Seattle or Genoa, but whether they can 
build lasting institutions to resist the extension of empire through 
countervailing structures of governance. Only transnational in-
stitutions can do so at all levels of security, disarmament, econo-
mics and law. We need transparent and accountable structures of 
world governance and coordination. Some of these structures are 
already in sight through the networking of economic, judicial, 
military, immigration, health and communication experts. They 
form horizontally networked sites of information, coordination, 
and regulation. The future of global citizenship lies in becoming 
65
actively involved in such transnational organizations and working 
towards global governance. Whether this implies world govern-
ment or not is at this stage beside the point: what matters is to 
increase structures of global accountability and governance.31
In the version of the global governance thesis advocated by Anne-
Marie Slaughter, who focuses less on the normative possibilities 
for democratic governance beyond borders but more on the hori-
zontal networks linking government officials in judicial, regula-
tory and administrative organizations across state boundaries, a 
realm of law “beyond the state” has already been created and the 
reach of global law is extended without the agency of the state 
and its institutions.
Whereas followers of the late Niklas Luhmann, such as Gunther 
Teubner, see structures of global governance resulting per im-
possibile through the self-regulating interlocking of anonymous 
systems of norm-generation which act as each other’s environ-
ment, Anne-Marie Slaughter places her faith in the networking 
of actual elites in the judiciaries across the world, administrative 
bureaucracies etc. The hope is that new norms and standards for 
public behavior will result through such interlockings.
Defenders of transnational governance have a point: the current 
state of global interdependence requires new modalities of co-
operation and regulation. Certain markers of sovereignty in the 
domain of arms control, ecology, combating disease and epide-
mics, and fighting the spread of poverty must be global joint ven-
tures which will require the work of all people of good will and 
good faith in all nations of the world. As David Held in particular 
has argued powerfully, the goal is not just to form institutions of 
transnational governance but to render existing ones such as the 
WTO, IMF and AID more transparent, accountable and respon-
sive to their constituencies needs. This in turn can only happen 
if popular movements within donor and member countries force 
the elites who govern these institutions toward democratic ac-
countability. It is naïve to assume, as Teubner and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter seem to, that the good faith of elites or the miracu-
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lous sociological signals of anonymous systems alone will move 
such structures towards democratization and accountability. They 
won’t. Transnational structures need to be propelled toward a dy-
namic where they can be controlled by public law.
Here, however, we reach a dilemma: precisely because state-cen-
tered politics has become so reduced in effectiveness today, new 
theoretizations of the political have emerged. Yet my critique of 
the models of empire and transnational governance seems to pre-
suppose a form of popular sovereignty, a global demos, which is 
nowhere in existence. Where is the popular sovereign who can 
counter empire or who can be the bearer of new institutions of 
transnational governance?
Today we are caught not only in the reconfiguration of sovereign-
ty but also in the reconstitutions of citizenship. We are moving 
away from citizenship as national membership increasingly to-
wards a citizenship of residency which strengthens the multiple 
ties to locality, to the region, and to transnational institutions. In 
this respect defenders of post-national citizenship are correct. The 
universalistic extension of civil and social rights, and in some 
cases, of political participation rights as well, to immigrants and 
denizens within the context of the European Union in particular, 
is heralding a new institution of citizenship. This new modality 
decouples citizenship from national belonging and being rooted 
in a particular cultural community alone. Not only in Europe, 
but all around the globe in metropolises such as London, Paris, 
Berlin, Frankfurt, New York, Mexico City, Madrid, etc. we see 
the rise of political activism on the part of non-nationals, post-
nationals, and ex-colonials. They live in multicultural neighbor-
hoods, they come together around women’s rights, secondary 
language education for their children, environmental concerns, 
jobs for migrants, representation in school boards and city coun-
cils. This new urban activism, which includes citizens as well as 
non-citizens, shows that political agency is possible beyond the 
member/non-member divide. The paradoxes of the “right to have 
rights” (Hannah Arendt) is ameliorated by those who exercise 
their democratic-republican participation rights with or without 
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the correct papers. The institutions of the nation-state are not the 
privileged site of the political.32
The local alone is not the site of post-national citizenship. New 
modalities of citizenship and a nascent public sphere are also 
emerging through the meetings of the World Social Forum in 
which activists from all nations, representing women’s, ecology, 
ethnic rights, cultural self-determination, economic democracy 
groups, NGO’s and INGO’s gather together, plan strategy and 
policy. They are, in many cases, the ones who articulate and bring 
to global awareness problems to which transnational structures 
of governance have to respond. These citizens’ groups and social 
activists are the transmitters of local and global knowledge and 
know-how; they are generators of new needs and demands that 
democracies have to respond to. They are members of the new 
global civil society. This new global civil society is not only in-
habited by multinational and transnationals, whether public and 
private, but also by citizens, movement activists and constituents 
of various kinds. This emergent global civil society is quite com-
plementary to republican federalism, which in my opinion consti-
tutes the only viable response to the contemporary disaggregation 
of sovereignty.
Republican Federalism and Democratic Sovereignty
I will define “republican federalism” as the constitutionally struc-
tured reaggregation of the markers of sovereignty, in a set of in-
terlocking institutions each responsible and accountable to the 
other. There is, as there must be in any structuring of sovereignty, 
a moment of finality, in the sense of decisional closure, but not 
a moment of ultimacy, in the sense of being beyond questioning, 
challenge and accountability. As the legal scholar Judith Resnik 
notes, the development of international law and of cosmopolitan 
human rights’ treaties are creating new modalities for the exerci-
se of federalism. “[F]ederalism is also a path for the movement of 
international rights across borders, as it can be seen from the ad-
option by mayors, local city councils, state legislatures, and state 
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judges of transnational rights including the United Nations Char-
ter and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discriminati-
on Against Women (CEDAW) and the Kyoto Protocol on global 
warming. Such actions are often trans-local – with municipalities 
and states joining together to shape rules that cross borders.”33
I call such processes of “law’s migration” (Resnik) across state 
boundaries and institutional jurisdictions, whether institutiona-
lized or popular, “democratic iterations.” By “democratic itera-
tions” I mean complex processes of public argument, delibera-
tion, and exchange through which universalist rights claims and 
principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, 
posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions, 
as well as in the associations of civil society. Democratic itera-
tions can take place in the “strong” public bodies of legislatives, 
the judiciary and the executive, as well as in the informal and 
“weak” publics of civil society associations and the media.
In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never sim-
ply produce a replica of the first original usage and its intended 
meaning: rather every repetition is a form of variation. Every it-
eration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever so sub-
tle ways. In fact, there really is no “originary” source of meaning, 
or an “original” to which all subsequent forms must conform. It 
is obvious in the case of language that an act of original meaning 
giving makes no sense, since, as Wittgenstein famously remind-
ed us, to recognize an act of meaning-giving as such an act, we 
would already need to possess language itself. A patently circular 
notion!
Nevertheless, even if the concept of “original meaning” makes 
no sense when applied to language as such, it may not be so ill-
placed in conjunction with documents such as the law and in-
stitutional norms. Thus, every act of iteration might refer to an 
antecedent which is taken to be authoritative. The iteration and 
interpretation of norms, and of every aspect of the universe of 
value, however, is never merely an act of repetition. Every act 
of iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in 
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a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is reposited 
and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Meaning 
is enhanced and transformed; conversely, when the creative ap-
propriation of that authoritative original ceases or stops making 
sense, then the original loses its authority upon us as well. Itera-
tion is the reappropriation of the “origin,” it is at the same time 
its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its con-
tinuous deployment.
“Democratic iterations” are processes of linguistic, legal, cultural, 
and political repetitions-in-transformation, invocations which are 
also revocations. Through such iterative acts a democratic people 
who considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and princi-
ples, reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing itself to 
be not only the subject but also the author of the laws. Whereas 
natural right doctrines assume that the principles which under-
line democratic politics are impervious to transformative acts of 
will, and whereas legal positivism identifies democratic legiti-
macy with the correctly posited norms of a sovereign legislature, 
jurisgenerative politics signals a space of interpretation and inter-
vention between transcendent norms and the will of democratic 
majorities. The rights claims which frame democratic politics, on 
the one hand, must be viewed as transcending the specific enact-
ments of democratic majorities under specific circumstances; on 
the other hand, such democratic majorities re-iterate these prin-
ciples and incorporate them into the democratic will-formation 
process of the people through argument, contestation, revision 
and rejection. Popular sovereignty no longer refers to the phys-
ical presence of a people gathered in a delimited territory, but 
rather to the interlocking in a global public sphere of the many 
processes of democratic iteration in which peoples learn from 
one another.
There will be an inevitable tension between the border- and 
boundary-transcending discourses of democratic iteration and 
state sovereignty. In fact, democracy is the process through which 
the popular sovereign tries to tame state sovereignty by making 
it responsive, transparent, and accountable to the people. The 
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spread of cosmopolitan norms which aim to protect the human 
being as such, regardless of national membership, but rather as 
a citizen of a global civil society, and popular sovereignty mutu-
ally reinforce one another. The lines between the inside and the 
outside are blurred. Whereas in the case of the decline of state 
sovereignty it is the receding of the public exercise of state power 
which is at stake, in the case of the augmentation of popular sov-
ereignty, international and cosmopolitan norms subject agencies 
of the public exercise of power and in the first place, the state 
itself, to heightened public and juridical scrutiny, thus aiding the 
assertion of popular sovereignty.
Cosmopolitan norms lead to border-crossing interlockings and 
coordinations of democratic iterations among those who are or-
ganized in human rights, women’s rights, ecology and indige-
nous rights movements. The “lex mercatoria” and other forms of 
law without the state generated by global capitalism, by contrast, 
strengthen private corporations vis-à-vis public bodies. Thus, 
in the case of North American Free Trade Agreement firms are 
granted rights hitherto generally limited to nation-states. Chap-
ter II (B) of the Treaty allows private businesses to submit com-
plaints against member-states to a three-member tribunal. One of 
the members is chosen by the affected state, another by the firm, 
and the third jointly by the parties. As Scheuerman observes, 
“NAFTA thereby effectively grants states and corporations equal 
authority in some crucial decision-making matters.” And he adds, 
“In a revealing contrast the procedures making up NAFTA’s labor 
‘side agreement’ deny similar rights to organized labor.”34
There is an interesting parallel here to the growing power of indi-
viduals to bring charges for human rights violations against states 
that are signatories to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in front of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. In this case as well, states are 
defendants and no longer immune from legal prosecution. In both 
cases, the “black box” of state sovereignty has been pried open 
but with very different normative consequences: in the case of 
NAFTA and other forms of lex mercatoria states becomes liable 
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to prosecution by corporate bodies which do not represent gene-
ralizable interests but only their particular interests and those of 
their constituents. Interestingly, at the same time they disempower 
organized labor and environmental groups from enjoying similar 
jurisdictional privileges in bringing charges against the state.
In the case of charges brought against states for human rights 
violations, there is a generalizable interest shared by all citizens 
and residents of a state alike, such as to prevent the use of torture 
for example and other forms of the widespread violation of hu-
man rights. Human rights trials against sovereign states even go 
beyond the generalizable interest of the citizens involved, to es-
tablish universalizable norms of human rights which would pro-
tect individuals everywhere and in any part of the world. There 
is a context-transcending power to these human rights iterations 
which feed into the normative power of cosmopolitan norms.
One cannot dogmatically preclude that private corporate litiga-
tions may involve cases with generalizable potential for world-
wide human rights standards. Corporations can behave as ethical 
persons: a well-known example is the behavior of American cor-
porations, largely under the influence of their share-holders, in 
South Africa to defy the apartheid regime and to employ South 
African Blacks. In this instance, corporate behavior which de-
fied the local state set a powerful moral example. But this is an 
unusual and infrequent example. By and large multinational cor-
porations, as evidenced by the greediness of pharmaceuticals in 
denying access to cheap AIDS drugs to devastated African na-
tions or by the rapaciousness of drug companies in applying for 
exclusive patents to the medicinal use of plants and flora in the 
Amazonas, act to protect the bottom line of their own profits. 
To the extent to which they become litigants against the state, 
however, they themselves become legal players against which 
democratic peoples and human rights groups can bring charges 
as well. If state sovereignty has been pried open, why not pry 
open corporate sovereignty as well? Why not extend the power of 
democratic iterations to multinational and transnational corpora-
tions and not only to states?
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The boundaries of the political have today gone beyond the re-
public housed in the nation-state. The deterritorialization of law 
brings in its wake a displacement of the political. It is clear that 
only multiple strategies and multiple forms of struggle can reas-
sert the ruptured link between consent and the public exercise of 
power which is the essence of democratic sovereignty. Transna-
tional structures of governance are fundamental today in order 
to tame the forces of global capitalism; but the accountability of 
transnational elites can only be demanded by their own constitu-
encies who mobilize for post- and trans-national citizenship pro-
jects. The interlocking networks of local and global activists in 
turn form an emergent global civil society, in which new needs 
are articulated for a world public, new forms of knowledge are 
communicated to a world-public opinion and new forms of soli-
darity across borders are crafted. 
The fact that an aggressive imperialism of our times also avails 
itself of the language of human rights and cosmopolitan norms 
to castigate “rogue states” and “terrorist harboring regimes” does 
not invalidate these norms: quite to the contrary: the population 
of these countries, who are the victims of their own abusive re-
gimes, of Jihadist movements, as well as of imperialist powers 
who intervene supposedly to rectify these abuses, deserve our 
solidarity in acts of cascading democratic iterations. Popular so-
vereignty cannot be regained today by returning to the era of the 
“black box” of state sovereignty: the formal equality of sovereign 
states must mean the universalization of human rights across state 
boundaries; respect for the rule of law and democratic forms of 
government. It is my faith, one shared by W.E.B. Du Bois and 
Hannah Arendt as well, that we can work toward reconfigurations 
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